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Abstract
This paper addresses the existence of Nash networks for the one-way ﬂow model of Bala
and Goyal (2000) in a number of diﬀerent settings. We provide conditions for the ex-
istence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous
and players obtain resources from others through the directed path between them. We
ﬁnd that costs of establishing links play a vital role in the existence of Nash networks.
Next we examine the existence of Nash networks when there are congestion eﬀects in
the model.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D85
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11 Introduction
The importance of networks in economic and social activities has led to the emer-
gence of a growing literature seeking to understand the formation of these networks.
This literature in economics has focused on three main questions: (i) What are the
incentives for self-interested players to form links with each others and what are the set
of the stable resulting networks? (ii) What networks are eﬃcient? and (iii) Is there a
conﬂict between the set of stable and eﬃcient networks?
We can discern two distinct strands in the literature diﬀerentiated by the type of sta-
bility concept used.
The ﬁrst type employs the notion of pairwise stability and its variants and is inspired
by Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996 [9]) work. These authors assume that a link is formed
between two players if both players involved in the link agree to form that link, though
link deletion occurs unilaterally. While beneﬁts depend on the overall graph, the cost of
setting up a relationship is shared equally between the two participating players. In a
pairwise stable network no pair of players has an incentive to form a link and no player
has an incentive to delete a link. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of pairwise stable networks can be found in Jackson and Watts (2001 [8]) .
The second literature develops a non-cooperative version of network formation. This
literature was initiated by Bala and Goyal (BG, 2000 [1]). These authors assume that
a player can establish a link with another player without the latter’s consent, as long
as she incurs the cost of forming the link. They present two versions of their model:
the one-way ﬂow model and the two-way ﬂow model. In the one-way ﬂow model, only
the (link) initiating player has access to the other player’s information, whereas in the
2two-way ﬂow model both players have access to each others information, regardless of
who initiates the link. For both versions, the corresponding static stable networks are
called Nash networks since Nash equilibrium is used to determine stability. In a Nash
network, no player has an incentive to change her links, given the links formed by the
other players.
The reason why Nash equilibria is an adequate concept for the one-way ﬂow model but
not for the consent model is that no coordination problem arises over setting up links
in the former and each links anouncement is guaranted to change the network.
Most of the existing studies in this literature have explored the characterization
of Nash networks, either in the two-way ﬂow model (Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst
(2005 [5]), Haller and Sarangi (2005 [7]) or in the one-way ﬂow model (Galeotti, 2004
[4], Billand and Bravard, 2005 [2]). The existence of Nash networks however has not
been studied in great detail. Indeed, although BG (2000 [1]) provide a constructive
proof of the existence of Nash networks in the one-way ﬂow model and the two-way
ﬂow model, this is done in a rather restrictive setting, since the authors assume that all
costs and beneﬁts are homogeneous across players. In a recent paper Haller, Kamphorst
and Sarangi (2005 [6]) study the existence of Nash networks in two-way ﬂow models
by incorporating value, cost and link heterogeneity. However, the existence issue had
remained unexplored in the one-way ﬂow setting.
In this paper, we investigate the existence of Nash networks in BG’s one-way ﬂow
model when costs and values of links are heterogeneous and players use pure strategies.
More precisely, we focus on one-way ﬂow model with linear payoﬀs and no decay.
The one-way ﬂow model is worth studying since it includes some important settings. For
3instance, a web site can provide a link or pointer to another web site without the sec-
ond web site’s permission. Likewise, a researcher can generally cite another researcher
without the second researcher’s permission. Lastly, ﬁrms can unilaterally establish links
with other ﬁrms, through intelligence economic activities, which include among others
reading of industry trade press or patent literature, talking with technology vendors,
sales representative or industry experts, and analyzing the competitors’ product.
Moreover, the question of existence of equilibria under heterogeneity is important, since
ex-ante asymmetries across players arise quite naturally in reality. For instance, in the
context of information networks, it is often the case that some individuals are better
informed, which makes them more valuable contacts. Similarly, as individuals diﬀer, it
seems natural that forming links is cheaper for some individuals as compared to others.
For instance, players can be deﬁned in terms of cultural, legal or geographical proximity,
and it may be cheaper for a given player to set a link with a closer player.
We can discern three types of heterogeneity. The ﬁrst one, value heterogeneity, concerns
the value of the ressources of a given player for the other players. The second one, cost
heterogeneity, concerns the cost of forming a link with a given player for the other play-
ers. The third type of heterogeneity, link heterogeneity, concerns the probability that a
link formed by a player with a given player fails to transmit information from the latter
player to the former player. It may also concern the loss of information that is incurred
when information is transmitted from a player to another player.
The introduction of various heterogeneity conditions for costs, values and links provides
a sensitivity check for the results obtained with homogeneous parameters. In other
words, we can ask if the introduction of diﬀerent kinds of heterogeneities in the Bala
and Goyal’s model alters the Nash networks existence results.
Our results concerning the existence of Nash network in the ono-way ﬂow model under
4various heterogeneity assumptions complement the existing literature. Indeed, Galeotti,
(2004 [4]) characterizes the (strict) Nash networks when cost and values of links are
heterogeneous, but we do not know under what conditions such equilibria exist. Fi-
nally, the existence of Nash networks has never been studied, when there are congestion
eﬀects. The possibility of congestion eﬀects was introduced by Billand and Bravard
(2005 [2]) as an extension of BG’s model (2000 [1]). Congestion eﬀects exist in several
situations where getting too many resources can actually prove an hindrance to agents.
For instance, when researchers are seeking to get some information about a part of their
ﬁeld which they are unsure about, they often read a literature survey written by an-
other scholar. This activity is costly in terms of time and eﬀort, for instance, to identify
relevant information sources. The reading eﬀort can be expensive and tedious if they
are too many sources. In extreme cases, if a survey is too exhaustive, it might have
little or no value to the scholarly reader. Billand and Bravard (2005 [2]) characterize
Nash networks when this assumption arises. However, they do not address the issue of
existence of Nash networks.
We now provide a quick overview of our results. We show that there does not al-
ways exist a Nash network when costs and values are heterogeneous. More precisely, we
ﬁnd that, as in the two-way ﬂow model, heterogeneity of cost in forming links plays a
great role in the non existence of Nash network. We then provide conditions on costs of
setting links to allow for the existence of Nash networks. We also show that if costs are
homogeneous, then there always exist Nash networks. Finally, we show that if costs and
values are homogeneous, but congestion eﬀects can occur, then a Nash network does not
always exist.
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set the basic one-
way ﬂow model. In Section 3 we present the results about the existence of Nash networks
in this model. More precisely we ﬁrst study this problem under various heterogeneity
conditions for costs, values and links. We then introduce the presence of congestion
eﬀects in Section 4.
2 Model Setup
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of players. The network relations among these players are
formally represented by directed graphs whose nodes are identiﬁed with the players. A
network g = (N,E) is a pair of sets: the set N of players and the edges set E(g) ⊂ N×N
of directed links. A link initiated by player i to player j is denoted by i,j. Pictorially
this is depicted as link from j to i to show the direction of information ﬂow.1 Each player
i chooses a strategy gi = (gi,1,...,gi,i−1,gi,i+1,...,gi,n), gi,j ∈ {0,1} for all j ∈ N \{i},
which describes the act of establishing links. More precisely, gi,j = 1 if and only if
i,j ∈ E(g). The interpretation of gi,j = 1 is that player i forms a link with player j  = i,
and the interpretation of gi,j = 0 is that i does not form a link with player j. We only
use pure strategies. Note that gi,j = 1 does not necessarily imply that gj,i = 1. It can
be that i is linked to j, but j is not linked to i. Let G = ×n
i=1Gi be the set of all possible
networks where Gi is the set of all possible strategies of player i ∈ N.
We now provide some important graph theoretic deﬁnitions. For a directed graph,
g ∈ G, a path P(g) of length m in g from player j to i, i  = j, is a ﬁnite sequence
i0,i1,...,im of distinct players such that i0 = i, im = j and gik,ik+1 = 1 for k =
0,...,m − 1. If i0 = im, then the path is a cycle. We denote the set of cycles in the
1Throughout the paper we refer to this as link from j to i. The same is true for other network
components like paths.
6network g by C(g). In the empty network, ˙ g, there are no links between any agents.
To sum up, a link from a player j to a player i (gi,j = 1) allows player i to get
resources from player j and since we are in a one-way ﬂow model, this link does not
allow player j to obtain resources from i. Moreover, a player i may receive information
from other players through a sequence of indirect links. To be precise, information ﬂows
from player j to player i, if i and j are linked by a path of length m in g from j to i.
Let
Ni(g) = {j ∈ N| there exists a path in g from j to i},
be the set of players that player i can access in the network g. By deﬁnition, we assume
that i ∈ Ni(g) for all i ∈ N and for all g ∈ G. Let ni(g) be the cardinality of the set
Ni(g). Information received from player j is worth Vi,j to player i. Moreover, i incurs
a cost ci,j when she initiates a direct link with j, i.e. when gi,j = 1. We can now deﬁne
the payoﬀ function of player i ∈ N:
πi(g) =
X
j∈Ni(g)
Vi,j −
X
j∈N
gi,jci,j.
We assume that ci,j > 0 and Vi,j > 0 for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, i  = j. Moreover, we
assume that Vi,i = 0 for all i ∈ N. The next deﬁnition introduces the diﬀerent notions
of heterogeneity in our model.
Deﬁnition 1 Values (or costs) are said heterogeneous by pairs of players if there exist
i ∈ N, j ∈ N, k ∈ N such that Vi,j  = Vi,k (ci,j  = ci,k) and there exist i′ ∈ N, j′ ∈ N,
k′ ∈ N such that Vj′,i′  = Vk′,i′. Values (or costs) are said heterogeneous by players if for
all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, k ∈ N: Vi,j = Vi,k = Vi (ci,j = ci,k = ci) but there exists i ∈ N, i′ ∈ N
such that Vi  = Vi′ (ci  = ci′).
7We now provide some useful deﬁnitions for studying the existence of Nash networks.
Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network obtained when all of player i’s links
are removed. The network g can be written as g = g−i ⊕ gi, where the operator ⊕
indicates that g is formed by the union of links in gi and g−i. The strategy gi is said
to be a best response of player i to g−i if:
πi(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ πi(g
′
i ⊕ g−i),for all g
′
i ∈ Gi.
The set of player i’s best responses to g−i is denoted by BRi(g−i). Furthermore, a
network g = (g1,...,gi,...,gn) is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each
i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 2 We say that two networks g and g′ are adjacent if there is a unique player
i such that gi,j  = g′
i,j for at least one player j  = i and if for all player k  = i, gk,j = g′
k,j,
for all j ∈ N.
An improving path is a sequence of adjacent networks that results when players
form or sever links based on payoﬀ improvement the new network oﬀers over the current
network. More precisely, each network in the sequence diﬀers from the previous one by
the links formed by one unique player. If a player changes her links, then it must be
that this player strictly beneﬁts from such a change.
Deﬁnition 3 Formally, an improving path from a network g to a network g′ is a ﬁnite
sequence of networks g1,...,gk, with g1 = g and gk = g′, such that the two following
conditions are veriﬁed :
1. gℓ and gℓ+1, are adjacent networks;
82. for this unique player i, we have g
ℓ+1
i ∈ BRi(gℓ
−i) and gℓ
i  ∈ BRi(gℓ
−i), that is gℓ+1
is a network where i plays a best response while gℓ is a network where i does not
play a best response.
Moreover, if g1 = gk, then the improving path is called an improving cycle.
It is obvious that a network g is a Nash network if and only if it has no improving path
emanating from it.
Finally, we deﬁne η : G →
R, η(g) =
P
i∈N ni(g) as a function.
3 Model with Heterogeneous Agents without Con-
gestion Eﬀect
Bala and Goyal (2000 [1]) outlines a constructive proof of the existence of Nash networks
in the case of costs and values of links homogeneity. Here we begin by showing that in
one-way ﬂow models with cost and value heterogeneity by pairs of players (see Galeotti,
2004 [4]) there always exists a Nash network if the number of players is n = 3. This
result is no longer true if the number of players is n > 4. However, if values of links are
heterogeneous by pairs of players and costs of links are heterogeneous by players, there
always exists a Nash network.
Proposition 1 If the values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs and n = 3,
then a Nash network exists.
Proof Let N = {1,2,3}. We begin with the empty network ˙ g. Either ˙ g is a Nash
network and we are done, or ˙ g is not a Nash network and there exists an improving
path from ˙ g to an adjacent network g1. That is, there exists a player, say without loss
9of generality player 1, such that ˙ g1  ∈ BR1(˙ g−1) and g1
1 ∈ BR1(˙ g−1). Since 1 ∈ N has
no link in ˙ g and forms links in g1 = g1
1⊕ ˙ g−1, we have η(˙ g) < η(g1). Now we will repeat
the same step. Assume an improving path from a network g1 to a network gk where
for each player i ∈ N, we have Ni(gk−1) ⊆ Ni(gk). We show that if there exists an
improving path from gk to gk+1, then for each player i ∈ N, Ni(gk) ⊆ Ni(gk+1). Let i
be a player such that g
k+1
i ∈ BRi(gk
−i) and gk
i  ∈ BRi(gk
−i). We show that if j ∈ Ni(gk),
then j ∈ Ni(gk+1). Indeed there are two possibilities for j ∈ Ni(gk).
1. Either gk
i,j = 1, that is i directly obtains the resources of player j. Then there are
two possibilities.
• If Vi,j −ci,j > 0 then j ∈ Ni(gk+1), otherwise i does not play a best response
in gk+1.
• If Vi,j−ci,j < 0, then there is a network gk′, k′ < k, such that ℓ ∈ Nj(gk′) and
Vi,j + Vi,ℓ − ci,j > max{0,Vi,ℓ − ci,ℓ}, else gk
i,j = 0. Since Nj(gk′
) ⊆ Nj(gk),
for all k′ < k and for all j ∈ N, we have ℓ ∈ Nj(gk) and player i deletes her
link with j only if j ∈ Nℓ(gk) and Vi,j + Vi,ℓ − ci,j < Vi,j + Vi,ℓ − ci,ℓ. In that
case, i forms a link with ℓ and j ∈ Ni(gk+1).
2. Or gk
i,j = 0, gk
i,ℓ = 1 and gk
ℓ,j = 1, that is i indirectly obtains the resources of
player j. Then, we use the same argument as above to show that player i deletes
her link with ℓ only if she has an incentive to form a link with j and j ∈ Ni(gk+1).
We now show that there does not exist any cycle in an improving path Q = {˙ g,g1,...,
gt,...,gt+h,...,gt+h′,...}, with h′ > h > 0. In other words, we show that if gt
i,j = 1,
g
t+h
i,j = 0, and g
t+h′
i,j = 1, then we have Ni(gt) ( Ni(gt+h′
). We note that as j ∈ Ni(gt)
and Ni(gt) ⊆ Ni(gt+h), we have j ∈ Ni(gt+h). Also, as g
t+h
i,j = 0, we have g
t+h
i,ℓ = 1 and
ℓ ∈ Ni(gt+h). Moreover, as Ni(gt+h) ⊆ Ni(gt+h′
), we have Ni(gt+h′
) = {j,ℓ}.
10Without loss of generality, we suppose that player i deletes the link i,j for the ﬁrst time,
between t and t + h, in gt+h. Likewise, we assume that player i forms the link i,j for
the ﬁrst time, between t + h and t + h′, in gt+h′
.
We have two cases.
1. Suppose we have gt
i,ℓ = 0. To obtain a contradiction, assume that ℓ ∈ Ni(gt).
It follows that g
t+h
j,ℓ = 1 since player i does not form the link i,ℓ between gt and
gt+h if j preserves the link j,ℓ. Also j does not delete the link j,ℓ between gt
and gt+h if i does not form the link i,ℓ (recall that in our process only one player
changes her strategy at each period). Since player i chooses to delete the link
i,j in gt+h, then she must form the link i,ℓ and we must have g
t+h
ℓ,j = 1, since
ℓ ∈ Ni(gt) ⊆ Ni(gt+h). Moreover, we note that the substitution of the link i,j
by the link i,ℓ implies that ci,j > ci,ℓ. Using same argument, player ℓ has not
deleted the link ℓ,j between gt+h and gt+h′
. Therefore, if player i forms the link
i,j in gt+h′ (and so deletes the link i,ℓ), then we have ci,j < ci,ℓ and we obtain the
desired contradiction.
2. Next, suppose that we have gt
i,ℓ = 1. If player i deletes the link i,j in gt+h, then
we obtain the situation in case 1 up to a permutation of players j and ℓ. Hence
the proof follows.
￿
We have shown that if values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs and n = 3,
then there always exists a Nash network. Note that this result is not true for the model
with directed links and two-way ﬂow of resources (see Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi
2006 [6] p. 7). We next show with an example that the above proposition is not valid
for n > 3.
11Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3,4} be the set of players and Vi,j = V for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N.
More precisely, we suppose that c1,3 = V −V/16 and c1,2 = c1,4 = 4V ; c2,1 = 2V −V/16
and c2,3 = c2,4 = 4V ; c3,2 = 2V − V/8, c3,4 = 2V − V/6 and c3,1 = 4V ; c4,1 = 3V − V/8
and c4,2 = c4,3 = 4V .
1. In a best response, player 2 never forms any link with player 3 or player 4. More-
over, player 2 has an incentive to form a link with player 1 if the latter gets
resources from player 3 or player 4.
2. In a best response, player 4 never forms links with player 3 or player 2.
3. Then the unique best response of player 1 to any network in which she does not
observe player 3 is to add a link with player 3 (since player 2 and player 4 never
form a link with player 3). Moreover, we note that player 1 never has any incentive
to form a link with player 2 or player 4.
4. In a best response, player 3 never forms any link with player 1.
Now let us take those best replies for granted and consider best responses regarding the
remaining links 2,1; 3,2; 3,4 and 4,1. If player 2 initiates link 2,1 (see g0 in ﬁgure 1),
then player 3’s best response is to initiate link 3,2 (see g1). In that case player 4 must
initiate the link 4,1 (see g2) and player 3 must replace the link 3,2 by the link 3,4 (see
g3). Then, player 4 must delete the link 4,1 (see g4) and the player 3 must replace the
link 3,4 by the link 3,2 (see g1). Hence there do not exist any mutual best responses.
Therefore, a Nash network does not exist. Finally, by appropriately adjusting costs, it
can be veriﬁed that this example holds even if we relax the assumption that Vi,j = V
for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N.
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This example shows that existence results in one-way ﬂow model with heterogeneity
depends crucialy on the number of players. Indeed, the proof of existence of Nash
networks with three players is based on the following fact. After a given player i has
played a best response, the set of players whom she obtains resources always contains
the set of players whom she obtained resources before.
Our example stresses that this property does not hold anymore when n > 3. More
precisely, in this example, player 3’s best response leads him not to obtain resources
from player 2 anymore in network g4.
3.1 Existence of Nash networks and heterogeneity of values by
pairs
In this section, we present a proof of the existence of Nash network in the one-way ﬂow
model where values are heterogeneous by pairs and costs are heterogeneous by players.
This proof can not be similar to the proof of Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2006 [6])
who adress the Nash existence problem in the two-way ﬂow model. Indeed, to prove
that a Nash network always exists, the authors built a sequence of networks, beginning
with the empty network. At each step of the sequence, a player who does not play a
13best response gets an opportunity to modify her links and play a best response (if no
player has an incentive to modify her links, then the network is Nash). A distinctive
feature of this process is that there can not exist a step in the sequence where a player
has an incentive to modify her links and as a consequence to let another player get
access to the resources of a smaller number of players than in the preceding step. Since
the number of players is ﬁnite, there inevitably exists a step in the sequence where
the corresponding network is a Nash network. In the one-way ﬂow model, the above
characteristic is no longer true. As a consequence, we cannot exclude the existence
of cycles in the best response process. So we will not be able to conclude about the
existence of Nash networks The following example is an illustration.
Example 2 Let N = {1,...,5}. Suppose that the best responses process lead to the
network g0 in ﬁgure 2. Suppose now that player 4 is such that V4,2 + V4,3 < V4,5. So, if
player 4 revises her strategy, we obtain the network g1. We observe that player 5 does
not hold resources anymore from 2 and 3 in g1. If V5,1 + V5,4 < c, then player 5 has an
incentive to delete the link 5,1 and we obtain the network g2. If V4,5 < c, then player 4
has an incentive to delete the link 4,5 and to form the link 4,3. In that case, we obtain
the network g3. Lastly in this network, player 5 has an incentive to form the link 5,1,
and we obtain the network g0.
Figure 2: Best responses process of example 2
5
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3 4
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14Our proof takes into account this problem of cycle, by modifying the network obtained
when a player plays a best response in such a way that no player has any incentive to
remove one of her links.
The proﬁt function when values are heterogeneous by pairs and costs are heterogeneous
by players is:
πi(g) =
X
j∈Ni(g)
Vi,j − ci
X
j∈N
gi,j.
Let π
j
i(g) be the marginal payoﬀ of player i from player j in the network g. If gi,j = 1,
then π
j
i(g) = πi(g) − πi(g ⊖ i,j). Let K(g;i,j) = Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j), where
g ⊖ i,j denotes the network g without the link i,j. We can rewrite π
j
i(g) as follows:
π
j
i(g) =
X
k∈Ni(g−i⊕i,j)
Vi,k −
X
k∈K(g;i,j)
Vi,k − ci. (1)
Proposition 2 If values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are het-
erogeneous by players, then a Nash network exists.
The proof of Proposition 2 is long, and involving a number of lemmas. So we ﬁrst
provide a quick overview of the proof. It consists of constructing a sequence of networks,
Q = (g0,...,gt−1,gt,...) beginning with the empty network. In each subsequent net-
work, no player should have an incentive to decrease the amount of resources she obtains.
Note that this sequence of networks is not an improving path. Indeed, we go from gt
to gt+1 in several operations. First, in gt we let a player i ∈ N, who is not playing
a best response in gt, to play a best response (if no such player exists, gt is a Nash
network) and obtain a network called bri(gt). Second, we modify the network bri(gt) as
follows: we construct a cycle using all players j ∈ N who obtain resources from a player
k who forms part of a cycle in bri(gt), while preserving all links in bri(gt) between a
player k ∈ N and a player j who is not part of a cycle in bri(gt). We obtain a network
15called h(bri(gt)). Thirdly, we delete all links i,j which does not allow player i to obtain
additional resources in h(bri(gt)). We obtain a network called m(h(bri(gt))) = gt
i, and
in the sequence Q, we have gt+1 = gt
i.
When a player i receive an opportunity to revise her strategy, we go from a network gt−1
to a network gt, and we will show that η(gt−1) < η(gt). Since the amount of resources
that players can obtain in a network g ∈ Q is ﬁnite, Q is ﬁnite and there exists a Nash
network.
In the following paragraph, we deﬁne a class of networks G3 which contains all net-
works in the sequence Q. Then, we provide a condition which implies that no player has
an incentive to delete a link in a network g ∈ G3 (Lemma 2). Finally, we show that all
networks gt ∈ Q satisfy this condition since the empty network satisﬁes this condition
(Lemma 6).
Let us formally deﬁne the set G3. Let M : G → P(G), g  → M(g) ⊂ G be a
correspondence. Let m(g) ∈ M(g) be a minimal network associated to the network g,
m(g) is a network such that, for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, Ni(g) = Ni(m(g)) and if m(g)i,j = 1,
then j  ∈ Ni(m(g) ⊖ i,j) and gi,j = 1. We note that in a network m(g) ∈ M(g), there
is at most one path from a player i ∈ N to a player j ∈ N. In the following, we can
take, without loss of generality, any element of M(g). Let m(g) be a typical element of
M(g). Obviously, we have η(g) = η(m(g)).
We say that g is a minimal network if g = m(g). We denote by Gm the set of
minimal networks. Let G1 = {g ∈ Gm|i ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Ni(g),k  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ gk,i = 0} be
a subset of minimal networks. If g ∈ G2 and g contains a cycle, then we denote by
C(g) the cycle in the network g. We denote by NC(g) the set of players who belong to
16the cycle C(g), and EC(g) ⊂ NC(g) × NC(g) the set of links which belong to the cycle
C(g). Let G3 = {g ∈ G2|i ∈ C(g),j  ∈ C(g) ⇒ gj,i = 0} be the set of networks which
belong to G2 and where there does not exist any link from a player i ∈ NC(g) to a player
j  ∈ NC(g).
We now present some lemmas which allow us to prove Proposition 2. The ﬁrst lemma
presents some properties about links that cannot arise in the set G3.
Lemma 1 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are
heterogeneous by players and g ∈ G3.
1. If gj,i = 1, then there does not exist a player k such that gk,i = 1.
2. If gi,j = 1, then K(g;i,j) = Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j) is an empty set.
Proof We successively prove both parts of the lemma.
1. To obtain a contradiction suppose that there exist two players i and j such that
gj,i = 1 and gk,i = 1 in g ∈ G3. Then there are two possibilities:
Suppose i ∈ NC(g). Given that i ∈ NC(g) there can be at most one link to player
i. Hence it is not possible that j ∈ NC(g) and k ∈ NC(g) simultaneously. Only
one of them is in NC(g). Without loss of generality let j ∈ NC(g). Then gk,i = 1
violates the fact that g ∈ G3.
Suppose i / ∈ NC(g). Then we know that gi,j = 0 = gi,k otherwise i ∈ NC(g).
From the minimality of g we know that j / ∈ Nk(g) and k / ∈ Nj(g). Putting all
this together we have i ∈ Nj(g), j / ∈ Nk(g), k / ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ gk,i = 0. This is a
contradiction.
172. Suppose there exists a player k ∈ Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j). Then, there exist
two diﬀerent paths from player k to player i which is impossible by the minimality
of g.
￿
It follows that if g ∈ G3, then we can write π
j
i(g) as follows:
π
j
i(g) =
X
k∈Ni(g−i⊕i,j)
Vi,k − ci. (2)
In the following lemma, we let g′
i ∈ Gi be a strategy of player i, with g′
i  = gi. This
lemma provides the best response properties of the networks g ∈ G3.
Lemma 2 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs, costs of links are hetero-
geneous by players and g ∈ G3.
1. Suppose players i ∈ N, j ∈ N, k ∈ N are such that j  ∈ Ni(g), i ∈ Nj(g),
k  ∈ Nj(g). If g′
k,i = 1, then g′
k  ∈ BRk(g−k).
2. Suppose g contains a cycle C(g) and for all i ∈ NC(g), and for all i,j ∈ EC(g), we
have π
j
i(g) > 0. If g′
i,j = 0, then g′
i  ∈ BRi(g−i).
3. Suppose i ∈ N, j ∈ N \ NC(g) and gi,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0. If g′
i,j = 0, then
g′
i  ∈ BRi(g−i).
Proof We now prove each part of the lemma.
1. Let players i, j and k be such that j  ∈ Ni(g), i ∈ Nj(g) and k  ∈ Nj(g). By lemma
1.1, we know that gk,i = 0. Either already i ∈ Nk(g) and the formation of the link
k,i is not a best response for player k, or i  ∈ Nk(g). In the latter case, we have
j  ∈ Nk(g), Ni(g) ⊂ Nj(g), so πk(g ⊕ k,j) − πk(g ⊕ k,i) ≥ Vk,j > 0. From this it
18follows that player k does not play a best response if she forms a link with player
i.
2. Without loss of generality, let C(g) be such that NC(g) = {1,2,...,p} and EC(g) =
{p,1;2,1;3,2;...;1,p}. For simplicity now consider a player i  = p.
It is straightforward from π
i−1
i (g) > 0 and the minimality of g that player i does
not play a best response if she deletes the link i,i−1 ∈ EC(g) and does not replace
that link.
We ﬁrst show that player i cannot play a best response if she replaces the link
i,i−1 by a link i,k, with k  = i−1. Indeed, if player i replaces the link i,i−1 by
a link i,k, k ∈ Ni(g), then player i is not playing a best response.
We now show that if player i replaces the link i,i − 1 by a link i,k, k  ∈ Ni(g),
then player i does not play a best response. Indeed, since g ∈ G3, there does
not exist a player k  ∈ Ni(g), with k ∈ N \ NC(g), such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and
ℓ ∈ NC(g). Otherwise, there exist a player k′ ∈ N \ NC(g), with k ∈ Nk′(g), and
a player ℓ′ ∈ NC(g) such that gk′,ℓ′ = 1. In that case, g  ∈ G3 and we obtain
a contradiction. Likewise, there does not exist a player k  ∈ Ni(g) such that
ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ Ni(g)\NC(g). Indeed, if ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ Ni(g)\NC(g), then
there exists a player ℓ′ such that gℓ′,ℓ = 1, with ℓ′ ∈ Ni(g) and a player k′ such
that gk′,ℓ = 1, with k′ ∈ Nk(g) which is impossible by lemma 1.1. It follows that a
player i ∈ NC(g) cannot obtain the resources of a player ℓ ∈ Ni(g)\Ni(g⊖i,i−1)
from a player k  ∈ Ni(g). Hence, if player i replaces the link i,i − 1 ∈ EC(g) by a
link i,k with k  ∈ Ni(g), then player i does not play a best response.
3. It is straightforward from π
j
i(g) > 0 and the minimality of g that player i has no
incentive to delete the link i,j if she does not replace that link.
19We now show that player i has no incentive to replace the link i,j. In other words,
we show that there does not exist a player k who obtains a part of the resources
of j and allows i to obtain more resources than j.
Let k be such that Nk(g)∩Nj(g) = ∅. Then player i has no incentive to substitute
the link i,k to the link i,j. Hence Nk(g) ∩ Nj(g)  = ∅.
First, we must show that if Nk(g) ∩ Nj(g)  = ∅, then either Nk(g) ⊂ Nj(g) or
Nj(g) ⊂ Nk(g). If the former is true the proof is obvious and we will only focus
on the latter. Note that in g, Nk(g)  = Nj(g) since j  ∈ NC(g). To obtain a
contradiction, suppose that Nk(g) ∩ Nj(g)  = ∅, Nk(g) * Nj(g) and Nj(g) *
Nk(g). Then there exist players ℓ ∈ Nj(g) ∩ Nk(g), ℓj ∈ Nj(g) and ℓk ∈ Nk(g),
such that gℓj,ℓ = gℓk,ℓ = 1, which is impossible by Lemma 1.1.
Second, we must show that there does not exist a player k ∈ N, such that Nj(g) ⊂
Nk(g) and Ni(g) * Nk(g), who obtains the resources of j and allows i additional
resources. If Ni(g) = Nk(g), then i ∈ NC(g), k ∈ NC(g) and in that case player i
cannot obtain a part of the resources of player j due to a link with player k, since
g is a minimal network. Therefore, we just need to show that the above statement
is true for strict set inclusion. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists a
player k ∈ N such that Nj(g) ⊂ Nk(g) and Ni(g)  ⊂ Nk(g). Then there exists a
player ℓk ∈ Nk(g) such that gℓk,j = 1. Therefore, we have gℓk,j = 1 and gi,j = 1
which is impossible by Lemma 1.1. Since Nj(g) ⊂ Nk(g), Ni(g) ⊂ Nk(g), and
gi,j = 1, by Lemma 1.2, player i cannot obtain a part of the resources of j due to
her link with player k. Consequently, if player i deletes the link i,j and replaces
it by the link i,k, then she does not play a best response.
￿
20We now introduce some additional deﬁnitions that are required to complete the
proof. Let MBRi(g−i) be a modiﬁed version of the best response function of player
i ∈ N. More precisely, g′
i ∈ MBRi(g−i) if g′
i is a best response of player i against
g−i and if player i does not form any links that yield zero marginal payoﬀs. Let bri :
G → G, g  → bri(g) be a function. The network bri(g) = (g′
i ⊕ g−i) is a network
where g′
i ∈ MBRi(g−i), and all other players j  = i having the same links as in the
network g. In other words, in bri(g), we have bri(g)i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0 and
bri(g)i,j = 0 ⇒ π
j
i(bri(g)) ≤ 0.
Let NC(g) be the set of players who belong to a cycle in g. Let H : G → P(G) be
a correspondence. A network h(g) ∈ H(g) is a network associated with g such that
h(g) contains at most one cycle, C(h(g)). Moreover, if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and
ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(h(g)). If k  ∈ NC(h(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓ,k = h(g)ℓ,k.
This is diﬀerent from the networks in G2 since there is no minimality restriction here.
This operation creates one cycle leaving unchanged the strategies of those players that
do not form a part of the cycle.
Observe that for all g ∈ G and for all k ∈ N, we have, by construction, for all
g′ ∈ M ◦ H(g), Nk(g) ⊆ Nk(g′).
Finally, we deﬁne
g
i ∈ M ◦ H ◦ bri(g), (3)
to be a network obtained from g after performing the three operations deﬁned above.
Note that the superscript in gi refers to the fact that in this network player i is playing
a best response.
Lemma 3 If g ∈ G3, then gi ∈ G3.
Proof We must show that gi has the following four properties: it is a minimal network,
it contains at most one cycle, there does not exist a link from j  ∈ NC(gi) to k ∈ NC(gi)
21and if ℓ ∈ Nj(gi),j  ∈ Nℓ(gi),k  ∈ Nj(gi) then gi
k,ℓ = 0. The ﬁrst property follows from
the correspondence M and the next two from the correspondence H. We just need to
verify that the last property is enjoyed.
First, we show that in bri(g), we have ℓ ∈ Nj(bri(g)), j  ∈ Nℓ(bri(g)), i  ∈ Nj(bri(g))
⇒ bri (g)i,ℓ = 0. We know that in g we have ℓ ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Nℓ(g),i  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ gi,ℓ = 0
since g ∈ G3. By deﬁnition, we have bri(g)k = gk, for all k ∈ N \ {i}. Hence, if we
show that player i  ∈ Nj(bri(g)) has not formed a link i,ℓ with a player ℓ such that
ℓ ∈ Nj(bri(g)) and j  ∈ Nℓ(bri(g)) in bri(g), then we will have shown the conclusion for
bri(g). But, by Lemma 2.1, we know that if i has formed a link with player ℓ, then i is
not playing a best response which is a contradiction.
Second, by construction, if g is such that ℓ ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Nℓ(g),k  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ g
k,ℓ = 0,
then g′ ∈ M ◦ H(g) is such that ℓ ∈ Nj(g′), j  ∈ Nℓ(g′), k  ∈ Nj(g′) ⇒ g′
k,ℓ = 0. The
conclusion follows. ￿
The next lemma covers properties of networks in gi and bri(g).
Lemma 4 Suppose g ∈ G3 and for all k ∈ N, j ∈ N, gk,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
k(g) > 0.
1. If k ∈ Nj(g), then k ∈ Nj(bri(g)).
2. If k ∈ Nj(g), then k ∈ Nj(gi).
3. If gi  ∈ BRi(g−i), then η(g) < η(gi).
Proof We successively prove each part of the Lemma.
1. Observe that for all k  = i, and for all j ∈ N, we have gk,j = bri(g)k,j. Hence,
if Nj(g) * Nj(bri(g)), then there exists a player k such that k ∈ Ni(g) and
k  ∈ Ni(bri(g)). Since g ∈ G3, we know from Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, that player i will
22not be playing a best response if she deletes one of her links. Hence, if k ∈ Ni(g),
then k ∈ Ni(bri(g)), and we obtain the desired conclusion.
2. We know from the ﬁrst part of the lemma that Nj(g) ⊆ Nj(bri(g)), and we know
that Nj(bri(g)) ⊆ Nj(g′), for all g′ ∈ M ◦ H(bri(g)). The result follows.
3. From the second part of the lemma, we know that Nj(g) ⊆ Nj(gi) for all j  = i.
We now show that if gi  ∈ BRi(g−i), then Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(gi). By Lemma 2.2 and
2.3, we know that player i cannot be playing a best response if she deletes links.
Hence, if she is playing a best response, it must be that Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(bri(g)). Since,
we know that, for all g′ ∈ M ◦ H(bri(g)), Ni(bri(g)) ⊆ Ni(g′), we conclude that
Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(gi). Therefore, η(g) < η(gi).
￿
Let us denote by g \ MBRi(g−i) = gm. Then gm ⊕ i,j is the network obtained from
bri(g) when player i forms no link except the link i,j.
Lemma 5 Suppose g ∈ G3.
1. If gi
i,j = bri(g)i,j = 1, then, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, Nj(gm ⊕ i,j) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i,j).
2. Suppose for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, gi,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0. If gi
k,ℓ = gk,ℓ = 1, then
Nℓ(g−k ⊕ k,ℓ) ⊆ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ).
Proof We prove the two parts of the lemma successively.
1. If j  ∈ NC(gi), then Nj(gi
−i) = Nj(gi). Indeed, since gi ∈ G3, j  ∈ NC(gi), and
gi
i,j = 1, player j does not obtain any resources from player i. Moreover, we have
by construction, Nj(bri(g)) ⊆ Nj(gi). It follows that Nj(gm⊕i,j) ⊆ Nj(bri(g)) ⊆
Nj(gi) = Nj(gi
−i) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i,j).
23Assume that j ∈ NC(gi), gi
i,j = bri(g)i,j = 1 and there exists a player ℓ such that
ℓ ∈ Nj(gm ⊕ i,j) and ℓ  ∈ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i,j). So in bri(g), player i obtains resources
from player ℓ through a path containing j, and in gi player i obtains resources
from player ℓ through a path which does not contain j, since for all k ∈ N,
Nk(bri(g)) ⊆ Nk(gi). Hence, there is a player j′ where j′ ∈ Ni(gi), j′  ∈ NC(gi)
and j′ ∈ Nj(gi) who has formed a link with player ℓ between bri(g) and gi. This
is not possible by construction.
2. If ℓ  ∈ NC(gi), then Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ) = Nℓ(gi) since player ℓ does not obtain any
resources from player k. Moreover, we know by Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 that Nℓ(g) ⊆
Nℓ(gi). It follows that Nℓ(g−k ⊕ k,ℓ) ⊆ Nℓ(g) ⊆ Nℓ(gi) = Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ).
Suppose now that ℓ ∈ NC(gi). Note that k ∈ NC(gi) since k has formed a link with
ℓ. For a contradiction assume that ℓ ∈ NC(gi) and Nℓ(g−k ⊕k,ℓ) * Nℓ(gi
−k⊕k,ℓ).
Then there is a player j such that j ∈ Nℓ(g−k ⊕k,ℓ) and j  ∈ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕k,ℓ). Also
note that j  ∈ NC(gi), otherwise j ∈ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕k,ℓ). Moreover, if j ∈ Nℓ(g−k ⊕k,ℓ)
and j  ∈ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ), then j  ∈ Nk(g ⊖ k,ℓ) and j ∈ Nk(gi ⊖ k,ℓ) since g ∈ G3,
and Nℓ(g) ⊆ Nℓ(gi) by Lemma 4.1 and 4.2. In other words, player k obtains
resources from player j in g through a path which contains ℓ, and in gi player k
obtains resources from player j through a path which does not contain ℓ. Hence,
there exists a player who has formed a link with a player ℓ′ where ℓ′ ∈ Nk(gi),
j ∈ Nℓ′(gi), and k  ∈ Nℓ′(gi) between g and gi. This is not possible by construction
of gi.
￿
Lemma 6 Let gi be deﬁned as in equation (3).
241. If g ∈ G3, then gi
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gi) > 0.
2. If for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, gi,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0, then for all i ∈ N \ {k}, j ∈ N,
gk
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0.
Proof We now prove successively the two parts of the lemma.
1. (a) First, we show that this property is true if gi
i,j = 1 and j  ∈ NC(gi). If
j  ∈ NC(gi), then by construction bri(g)i,j = 1 and so π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0. Using
Lemma 5.1, Lemma 3, and the marginal proﬁt function deﬁned in equation
(2) we have:
π
j
i(gi) =
P
k∈Nj(gi
−i⊕i,j)Vi,k − ci
≥
P
k∈Nj(gm⊕i,j)Vi,k −
P
k∈K(bri(g);i,j)Vi,k − ci
= π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0
(b) Second, we show that this property is true if gi
i,j = 1 and j ∈ NC(gi). By
construction if gi
i,j = 1 and j ∈ NC(gi), then i ∈ NC(gi). If i ∈ NC(gi),
then by construction of gi, there is at least one player ℓ ∈ NC(gi), such
that πℓ
i(bri(g)) > 0. So for all players ℓ′ ∈ NC(gi), there exists a network
(gi)′ ∈ M ◦ H ◦ bri(g) where player i forms a link with player ℓ′, and by
construction π
j
i(gi) = πℓ′
i ((gi)′). We know by Lemma 5.1, that Nj(gm ⊕
i,j) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i,j). Finally, by Lemma 3, we know that gi ∈ G3. Hence
25using the marginal proﬁt function deﬁned in equation (2) we have:
π
j
i(gi) =
P
k∈Nj(gi
−i⊕i,j)Vi,k − ci =
P
k∈Nℓ((gi
−i)′⊕i,ℓ) Vi,k − ci
≥
P
k∈Nℓ(gm⊕i,ℓ)Vi,k −
P
k∈K(gm⊕i,ℓ;i,ℓ)Vi,k − ci
= πℓ
i(bri(g)) > 0.
2. First, we show that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, and for all j  ∈ NC(gk), if gi,j = 1 ⇒
π
j
i(g) > 0, then gk
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0. Indeed, if player i ∈ N \ {k} has a link
with player j  ∈ NC(gk) in gk, then, by construction of gk, player i has a link with
player j in g, so π
j
i(g) > 0. We know, from Lemma 5.2, that for all j ∈ N, we
have Nj(g−i ⊕ i,j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i,j). Moreover, by Lemma 3, gk ∈ G3. So using
the marginal proﬁt function deﬁned in equation (2) we have:
π
j
i(gk) =
P
ℓ∈Nj(gk
−i⊕i,j)Vi,ℓ − ci
≥
P
ℓ∈Nj(g−i⊕i,j)Vi,ℓ − ci
= π
j
i(g) > 0.
Next, we show that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, and for all j ∈ NC(gk), if gi,j = 1 ⇒
π
j
i(g) > 0, then gk
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0. Since gk ∈ G3 and there exists a link
from player j to player i, we have i ∈ NC(gk). If i ∈ NC(gk), then there are
two possibilities: either k ∈ Ni(brk(g)) or i ∈ NC(g). We deal with these two
possibilities successively.
(a) If k ∈ Ni(brk(g)), then there exists in brk(g) a link i,ℓ such that brk(g)i,ℓ =
gi,ℓ = 1 and k ∈ Nℓ(brk(g)). Since, gi,ℓ = 1, we have πℓ
i(g) > 0. Furthermore,
26by construction, player ℓ ∈ NC(gk), since k ∈ Nℓ(brk(g)). We note that for
all players h′ ∈ NC(gk), there exists a network (gk)′ ∈ M ◦ H ◦ brk(g) where
player i forms a link with player h′, and by construction π
j
i(gk) = πh′
i ((gk)′).
We know from Lemma 5.2 that for all j ∈ N, we have Nj(g−i ⊕ i,j) ⊆
Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i,j). Finally, we know by Lemma 3 that gi ∈ G3. Hence, using the
marginal proﬁt function deﬁned by equation (2), we obtain:
π
j
i(gk) =
P
ℓ′∈Nj(gk
−i⊕i,j)Vi,ℓ′ − ci =
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ((gk
−i)′⊕i,ℓ) Vi,ℓ′ − ci
≥
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ(g−i⊕i,ℓ) Vi,ℓ′ − ci
= πℓ
i(g) > 0.
(b) If i ∈ N
C(g), then we have πℓ
i(g) > 0 for i,ℓ ∈ EC(g). We assume, without
loss of generality, that player i forms in C(gi) a link with a player j such
that π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0. By construction of gk we have NC(g) ⊆ NC(gk) and by
Lemma 5.2, we have Nj(g−i ⊕ i,j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i,j) for all j ∈ N. Note that
for all players h′ ∈ NC(gk), there exists a network (gk)′ ∈ M◦H◦brk(g) where
player i forms a link with player h′. Also by construction π
j
i(gk) = πh′
i ((gk)′).
We know by Lemma 3 that gi ∈ G3. Again, using the marginal proﬁt function
deﬁned by equation (2), we obtain:
π
j
i(gk) =
P
ℓ′∈Nj(gk
−i⊕i,j)Vi,ℓ′ − ci =
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ((gk
−i)′⊕i,ℓ) Vi,ℓ′ − ci
≥
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ(g−i⊕i,ℓ) Vi,ℓ′ − ci
= πℓ
i(g) > 0.
27￿
Proof of Proposition 2 We start with the empty network ˙ g = g0. It is straightforward
to check that g0 ∈ G3. Either g0 is a Nash network, and we are done, or there exists a
player, say i, who does not play a best response in g0. In that case, we construct the
network g1 ∈ M ◦ H ◦ bri(g0). We know from Lemma 4.3 that η(g0) < η(g1). From
Lemma 3, g1 ∈ G3 and from Lemma 6.1 and 6.2, we know that for all players j ∈ N and
ℓ ∈ N, g1
j,ℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(g1) > 0. Either g1 is a Nash network, and we are done, or there
exists a player, say j, who does not play a best response in g1. In that case, we construct
the network g2 ∈ M◦H◦brj(g1). We know from Lemma 4.3 that η(g1) < η(g2). Again
from Lemma 3, g2 ∈ G3 and from Lemma 6.1 and 6.2, we know that for all players
j ∈ N and ℓ ∈ N, g2
j,ℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(g2) > 0. It follows that we can construct a sequence
of networks {g0,g1 ...,gt,...} such that in gt−1, there exists a player, say k, who does
not play a best response, and gt ∈ M ◦ H ◦ brk(gt−1), η(gt−1) < η(gt), gt ∈ G3 and for
all j ∈ N, gt
j,ℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(gt) > 0. This sequence is ﬁnite since η(g) ≤ n2, for all g ∈ G .
￿
Proposition 2 establishes that if values of links are heterogeneous by pairs of players
and costs of links are heterogeneous by players, then a Nash network always exists. This
result is similar to the result of Haller and al. [6] in two-way ﬂow models. We now study
one-way ﬂow models when values of links are heterogeneous by players and costs of links
are heterogeneous by pairs of players.
283.2 Existence of Nash networks and heterogeneity of costs by
pairs
In example 1 we have shown that a Nash network does not always exist when values
of links are heterogeneous by players and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs of
players. We now state a condition which allows for the existence of Nash networks when
costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs. In that case, we can write the payoﬀ function
as follows:
πi(g) =
X
j∈Ni(g)
Vi −
X
j∈N
gi,jci,j.
Let π
j
i(g) denote the marginal payoﬀ of player i from player j in the network g. If
gi,j = 1, then π
j
i(g) = πi(g) − πi(g ⊖ i,j). Let K(g;i,j) = Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j).
We can rewrite π
j
i(g) as follows:
π
j
i(g) =
X
k∈Ni(g−i⊕i,j)
Vi −
X
k∈K(g;i,j)
Vi − ci,j. (4)
To prove the following proposition, we need an additional deﬁnition. First, we note
that we cannot use our previous recomposition of the best response network. More
precisely, the deﬁnition of H is not appropriate in the case of heterogeneous cost. Indeed,
in the previous section, we could place the players in the cycle without restriction because
there is no diﬀerence for player i to form a link with player j or player k since the costs
are the same. However, this is not true in the case of heterogeneous costs.
So, let Hi : G → G be a correspondence where hi(g) ∈ Hi(g) satisﬁes the following
conditions.
• If g contains at most one cycle and there does not exist any link from a player
j  ∈ C(g) to a player k ∈ C(g), then g = hi(g).
29• If player i has formed a link with no player j ∈ NC(g) or with at least two players
j ∈ NC(g) in g, then
1. if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(hi(g));
2. if k  ∈ NC(hi(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓ,k = hi(g)ℓ,k.
• If player i has formed a link with one and only one player j ∈ NC(g) in g, then:
1. if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(hi(g));
2. if k  ∈ NC(hi(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓ,k = hi(g)ℓ,k;
3. player i and player j belong to NC(hi(g)) and the link i,j ∈ E(hi(g)).
We now deﬁne ˆ g
i as follows: ˆ g
i ∈ M ◦ Hi ◦ bri(g).
Proposition 3 Consider a game where values of links are heterogeneous by players and
costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs. There always exists a Nash network if for all
i ∈ N, j ∈ N, j′ ∈ N: |ci,j − ci,j′| < Vi.
Proof The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of the proposition 2 with ˆ g
i
playing the same role as gi). ￿
Corollary 1 Suppose a game where values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs.
If for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, j′ ∈ N: |ci,j−ci,j′| < mink∈N{Vi,k}, then there is a Nash network.
The importance of these results stems from the fact that they identify conditions under
which Nash networks always exist under heterogeneity.
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In one-way ﬂow models with homogeneous players BG [1] establish that Nash networks
always exist. We show that this result is no longer true when the payoﬀ function
incorporates congestion eﬀects – a phenomenon that frequently arises in many network
settings. Billand and Bravard (2005 [2]) characterize Nash networks under congestion
eﬀects. In this section, we use their framework to show the non-existence of Nash
networks.
Let us deﬁne φ : N × {0,...,n − 1} → I R, (x,y)  → φi(x,y) be such that:
φi(x,y) > φi(x,y + 1).
Let ci(g) =
P
j =i gi,j be the costs incurred by i in the network g. We now deﬁne the
payoﬀ function of player i ∈ N as
¯ πi(g) = φi(ni(g),ci(g)).
As before we assume that player i obtains her own resources. We now provide an
example where a Nash network does not exist.
Example 3 Let N = {1,2,3}, and φ1(2,1) > φ1(1,0) > φ1(3,1), max{φk (2,1) ,φk(3,
2)} < φk(1,0) < φk(3,1), for k ∈ {2,3}.
First, networks in which a player forms two links are not Nash.
Second, the unique best response of player 2 (respectively 3) to any network g′ in
which player 1 and player 3 (respectively 2) have formed no link is to form no link.
Moreover, the unique best response of player 1 to a network g in which player 2 and
player 3 have formed no link is to form a link with player 2 or player 3. Therefore, the
empty network is not a Nash network.
31Third, a network g where n1(g)  = 2 cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, it is obvious
that n1(g) = 3 cannot be a Nash network since φ1(1,0) > φ1(3,1) > φ1(3,2). Moreover,
a network g where n1(g) = 1 cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, in a Nash network
where player 1 has formed no links, players 2 and 3 cannot have established any links,
since at least one of these players gets the ressources of one player only and we have
φk(2,1) < φk(1,0), for k ∈ {2,3}. In that case, when players 2 and 3 create no links,
player 1 has an incentive to establish a link with player 2 or player 3. To sum up if there
exists a Nash network g, then n1(g) = 2.
Without loss of generality, we consider networks g in which player 1 has formed a
link with player 2. In these networks,
1. player 2 has not formed a link with player 3 because in that case 2,3 ∈ N1(g) and
player 1 would have an incentive to delete the link 1,2.
2. Player 3 has an incentive to establish a link with player 1, since φ3(1,0) < φ3(3,1).
3. The networks in which a player has formed two links are not Nash networks.
Hence a Nash network does not exist.
The previous result remains true when players are homogeneous. But in that case,
examples are more complicated because we need at least 7 players to show a Nash
network does not always exist.
5 Discussion
Our diﬀerent results lead to two questions. The ﬁrst one is: Can the introduction of the
decay assumption change the diﬀerent results. Billand, Bravard and Sarangi (2006 [3])
32show that there does not always exist a Nash network in a framework with homogeneous
costs, heterogeneous values (by pairs) and decay. The second one is: How the results of
the paper are sensitive to the assumption of linearity in values and costs. This question
will be the subject of a future work.
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